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WEST-WEST CONFUCT AND THE MIDDLE EAST
There is fundamental di sagreerilent if not outright conflict between the
American and diverse European positions among the members of the Alliance with
respect to the Middle East.

This stems from diverse interpretations of both

regional and global situations.

Most important is the American globalization

of conflict an_d rivalry with the Soviet Union. · The extent to which the United
States projects U.S.-Soviet rivalry into regional disputes, such ·as in the
Middle East, Central· America, Southeast Asia, etc., distre_sses Europ_eans who
are preoccupied with their own problems.

Globalizing conflict to the extent

that all serious rifts are posited as attempts by international communism to
sway events and men in distant places deni.es legitimacy to the substance of
regional conflict.
Paradoxically, pojiting the Middle East situation as a principal area of
East/West discord denies the Russians a legitimate role in resolving Middle
Eastern conflicts.

Thus, while the Russians helped end the fighting in the

Yorn Kippur War, they were denied any· role in ·the evolving Israeli..;Egyptian
peace accords signed at Camp David.

But not only the Russi ans were excluded,

so too were·· the Bri ti.sh and French.
It is not surprising that there is· a lack of concordance among the allies
with respect to the Middle East or any other extra :alliance area.
.

Indeed, it

.

should be surprising ·to find con_cordance wi thi.n the alliance.

While it is

convenient to_ refer to NATO as a bloc it ·is only a bloc in relation to a
posture concerning a. p_ossible Sov{et attack upon members of the alliance.

As·

a multilateral alliance NATO is really a-set of dyadic alliances some of which
are more important than others.

There are fqr example, two hundred and forty

separate dyads within NATO; that is NATO is a set of two hundred and forty
dyadic alliances which operate within

the framework of the multilateral
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alliance.

When we talk in· the loose form of usual discourse, we sweep under

the rug all sorts of diverse conflicts and contradictions among the allied
members.

To cite just two examples; the Anglo-Icelandic llfisheries war 11 and_

the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus and the islands in the Aegean.
the

11

While

fisheries war 11 has been long resolved, we should take note of the fact

that Greece arms ·against Turkey and Turkey against Greece in the guise of
erecting a defence against possible Soviet aggression.

-,

Is _it any wonder that

I

there is conflict within those diverse dyads with respect to policy affecting
the Middle East?
Thus far we have been concerned with military security matters relating
to the development of policy.

Yet, military security issues are subordinate

to political-economic concerns in the development of national policies despite
the apparent preoccupation by_ major powers.
among

nations

is -political, _not· military,

The essence of relationships
and

is

preoccupied

w·ith

the

ambiguous goals of survival and well~being which are not necessarily achieved··
by military security policies.·

In democratic polities, _such concerns are

subordinate to conditions and perceptions of economic well-being on the part·
of

the

body

politic.

Questions

concerning

the

political

economies

of

individual countries take ·preceoence even over the overarching question of
security

from

attack.

And

the

political~economic

questions

prompt

increasingly difficult conflictual relationships not greater solidarity among
allies in the foreign policy arena.
In the economic arena, conditions of conflict among principal allies have
increased over the years at · a more rapid and a more pressing rate than
conditions of conflict between the superpowers.
NATO,

intra-allied

conflict was

minimal

dependent upon American economic goodwill

In the first two decades of

because Britain

and France wer'e

and Germany had no

independent

.

I
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policy; that is Germany adopted the very intelligent pose of not asserting any
political leadership which would have exposed her to collateral attack.

It-

was during this period that the United States, as the hegemonic power within
the alliance,
provided

pressed for

rhetorical

integration.

Real

high

support

levels of military cooperation
for

movements

toward - European

progress toward achieving true economic

but only
economic

integration of

Western Europe would have been threatening to the American economic position
in Europe and elsewhere.

It is not at all surprising that the United States

helped to reinforce posturing rather than unification and is equally clear
that the achievement of unification among the European states was unlikely
because of esse·ntial rivalries.

The developing events of the decades since

War ld War II have witnessed the rebirth of an economic national ism, of a
neo-mercantilism that is more reminiscent of the 1920 1 s and
other

comparable

relations

period.

Nation

states

engaged

1

30's than any

in competitive economic

seeking to establish positions of competitive advantage do not

develop policies that seek harmony; rather, they seek competitive advantage if not primacy.
It is not surprising that neither NATO _nor the European community -has
developed a real energy policy particularly in light of the fact that few if
any individual national governments have been able to arrive at a rational
economic policy for their economies~

What is left is a scramble for national

advantage in establishing access to energy sources at "reasonable" costs which
leads

to

competition

that

does

not

reinforce

collaborative policies relative to the Middle East.
- example,
_supplies.

conce_pts

of

identifying

France and Germanj, for

seek to strike deals - which assure access to adequate petroleum
The British can adopt a somewhat more "farsighted policy" because

of the development of North Sea oil.
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The watershed for post-war economic policy is provided by the series of
events running from late 1971-1973 when· the U.S. devalued, demonetized and
floated· the dollar.

The Nixon .Administra.tion yielded to a frustration that

had been building for some years and had not resulted from policfes largely of
its own making.

The U.S. dollar· had been: significantly overvalued and the

Germans. and Japanese particularly were perceived to be prospering at American
expense.
a

U.S.

The American economic hegemony had been turned on its head yi el ding
administration

first

pleading

for,

then

cajoling

demanding corrective action that has not yet taken place.

and

ultimately

The Bretton Woods

economic system was scrapped in large part and no replacement is yet in sight.
Economic policies among the allies came to be marked by a resurgent economic
nationalisfu, neo-mercantilism and protectionism.

The imposition of nontafiff

barriers has been accelerating since the end of the Nixon Administration and
shows no signs of diminishing.
The enveloping disarray in international

economic relations

has been

.accompanied by discordant energy policies whose pressures are currently abated
by what is likely to be a temporary oil glut.

The present excess of energy

supply over demand results in part from the impact of the global recession

which is sti·ll underway in Western Europe and shows signs of returning to the'.
U.s. and from American conservation efforts encouraged by high energy costs.
But energy costs did not simply ti se seeking some national
increased in large part in response to U.S. policy.

level -- they

The rapid decline in the

dollar's value from 1971-1973 was a factor since oil is priced in dollars.
October 1973 OPEC increased oil

In

prices in part to "punish" the West for

supporting Israel but also in order to recover yalue lost by the declining
dollar.

Further,

the U.S.

urged I ran to press for significantly greater

increases in order . to provide I ran with more foreign exchange to ·purchase
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weapons· and to promote conservation in the U.S.

At its December 1973 meeting

OPEC added approximately seven dollars to its pri_ce per barrel bringing the
.posted price to $12.65.

Kissinger was reported to have despaired at Congress'

inability

energy

to

adopt an

policy

raising

prices

adequate

to

promote

conservation.
The nexus of. economfc and energy po 1 i ci es had enormous consequences for
the West and provided no · particular· advantage for the· United StateS.

The

political

not

sophistication

manifested

by

the

Nixon

Administration was

matched in the economic arena and contributed to allied determination to
pursue economic and energy policies independent of the U.S.

Confidence in

American 1eadership was wanting; la tent suspicions of American i nsensi ti vi ty
and inadequacy were aroused, only to be compounded by dismay· at Watergate,
which was neither understood nor appreciated in Europe.
distr·ess concerning U.S.

Compounding European

leadership were the confusing alarms and signals

emanating from .Washington regarding Angola, Somalia, the War Powers Act, the
Mayaguez

Incident,

etc.,

which

were

reinforced

by more

recent American

gestures in.Lebanon and in the Caribbean.
President Carter's

signing

of

the_ SALT

II

agreement and subsequent

withdrawal of it from active consideration in the Senate was not reassuring to
Europeans who questioned the stability of American leadership.

Neither. was

the handling of the neutron bomb issue, nor the Schmidt i ni ti ati ve regarding
the

development

of

intermediate

developed Soviet SS-20 missiles.
the con~ept

11

range

weapons

to

respond

to

the

newly

Adding insult to injury was the handling of

detente 11 by Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan and the flap that

developed over the question of the Soviet gas pipeline to West Eur.ope which
was very badly handled by both the Carter and the Reagan Administrations.

The

net effect of all of these di verse factors was not to reinforce European
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reliance upon American

leadership but to encourage Europeans to seek

to

establish their own bargains and deals with respect to all of these issues.
In. the economic arena we all

witnessed the effects

of the

immense

transfer of weal th from energy consuming countri e·s to the energy producers.
New holders of vast quantities of dollars brought their money

into

the

financial markets and the sources of most of those ~etro dollars were- Arab
financiers.

The New York and London financial capitals became dependent upon

Arab dollars to transact their business.

While the United States was somewhat

immune to the impact of Arab financing, Western European countries were not.
They now had a rrew economic giant to deal with and that giant was hostile to
the American supported position of the Israeli 1 s.

Together with the impact of

the new economic realities, the introduction by the U.S.S.R. of new and more
threatening modes of nuclear blackmail aimed at Western Europe tied to the
discrediting of detente

by American

political leadership. also

impetus to European states to. establfsh their own policies.

served ·as

They now had to

have independ~rnt economic policies which· were both competitive .with the United
States and .which but challenged the premises of American pol icy.

The European

publics began to raise serious questions about the increased danger of being
linked to the United States.

The increase in defense expenditures in the:·

United States which began as a Carter Administration reaction to.the Soviet
invasion

of

Afghanistan

was

accelerated

even

further

by

the

Reagan

1

Administrat.ion which has not yet demonstrated true resolv e to deal with·the
Russians politically on the sensitive issues raised by the securities ·dilemma.
The European members of NATO feel that they are in an exposed position which
places them in the unhappy circumstance of being the most likely venue for the.
waging of a war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, unlikely as that
eventuality remains.
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What are the implications of all these factors for NATO and the Middle
East?

First, it is unlikely that there will be any coordination bf policies

by the European states and the United States with respect to the Middle East.
The Europeans are increasingly going to ·be more receptive and supportive of
Arab claims ·than Israeli claims to questions of territory, status and even
survival because of the impact of Arab petroleum supplies.
While the United States has demonstrated an ability to refrain from
intervening in the Iran-Iraq War, American posturing on_ the situation in
Persian Gulf was not terribly reassuring to European political leaders.

The

danger of an American challenge to the Russians relative to intervention
remains, even while it_ is unlikely.

And were such intervention to occur,

European access would be threatened.
A related

aspect rests

precisely

distance from American policy.

in

the

area of establishing some

Particularly with the introduction of the

Pershing II and cruise missiles into Western Europe, there is a developing
need for European pol i ti cal leaders to demonstrate independence from and, to
some degree, decoupling of European foreign policies from those of the United ·
States.

Relations with the Middle Eastern countries· provides a very _good

-opportunity for such an assertion· of independence.
A third factor that develops logically. from the first two rests upon the
need for the maintenance of the discrete _separation of regional from global
conflicts.

While this is related to the first two factors, it should be

stated explicitly.
the

Soviet Union,

The propensity of the super powers, the United States and
to

project

their

interests

in

regional

disputes

is

destablizing and unnerving to the European allies and to regional powers. ·The
greater the extent of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the more likely it will be
.for regional powers to seek to di stance themselves from the superpowers.
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To some extent this situation ·should exist among the middle eastern
countries.

But it is difficult to be achieved.

Israel over the years has put

a 11 its eggs in one basket, not entirely of its own chaos ing_, by becoming so
inextricably tied up in the Americ·ari relationship.

While it likes to see

itself in the role of "honest broker," the United States starts from a premise
of

commitment

territory,

etc.

to

the .principal
In

spite

of

Israeli

positions

disclaimers, · the

relative
effect

of

to

status,

the

Reagan

Administration's intervention into Lebanon was the promotion of Israeli goals
in the region.

Reagan may have convincea himself otherwise, but Arab states

and European states were not blind to the effect of US policy~
A more difficult question is who are the legitimate actors· who must be.
brought into any real attempts to establish regional peace.

American poli.cy

to exclude the Russians· from participating in any settlement makes sense in
terms of pas itioning American interest as primary in the region.

But H has

consequences at the same lime: it creates the opportunity for the USSR to
impose a veto u~on potential peace arrangements.

Of course, the United States

may oppose reentry of a Soviet diplomatic presence into the Middle East
because, for the US, peace in the Middle East may be less important than the
exclusion of Soviet interests and/or involvement.
Solutions to Middle East problems may be less likely thin survival, which. may be the best practicable outcome attainable in the forseeable fu_ture .. If_·
we recall the wars and conflicts raging throughout Europe for centuries, and
compare that history of turmoil and upheaval to the relatively benign current
situation, we may glean some useful_ insights.

It

is

likely that the

sublimation of diverse competitive European claims to territory, status, and
position may have been subsumed by the overarching conflict between ~he U.S.
and the U.S.$.R.

It is not until these two essentiallj European actors became
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the most important European bloc leaders that indigenous European rivalries
were surpressed.

The lesson provided by that experience is not a terribly

optimistic one to be projected upon the Middle East.
forty years of peace and prosperity.

But then Europe has had

Forty years of peace and prosperity

would not be such a bad thing for the Middle East.

